With support for the fight against the Taliban seeming to falter and indications that the Obama administration is looking at a broader range of non-military solutions, there has been a renewed interest in the idea of involving Iran in Afghan reconstruction. At a UN summit on Afghanistan in March, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke made a direct call for Iranian help in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, which was received positively. On Monday the Iranian official Ismail Moghaddam confirmed that Iran would help to train the Afghan government with anti-drugs operations. This could be a prelude to greater involvement.
Those advocating greater Iranian participation in Afghanistan claim that, as a Shia power, with links to the Northern Alliance, Iran has a clear sectarian interest in preventing the Sunni Taliban from regaining power. The strife in Afghanistan has also created a refugee problem on the Iranian border that Tehran is anxious to solve. Realists also argue that, since the United States already co-operates with autocratic states like Jordan and Egypt in combating terrorism, there is no reason why this principle cannot be applied elsewhere. Indeed, several Bush administration officials have conceded that, up until the controversial "axis of evil" speech, Iran had demonstrated a willingness to co-operate with the US.
Although the idea of integrating Iran into the fight against terrorists, insurgents and drug-lords in Afghanistan looks attractive, closer examination reveals that such a strategy is likely to backfire. Iran's past behaviour demonstrates its willingness to overlook sectarian differences, and the benefits of a stable region, and work with both Shia and Sunni terrorists. The Pentagon has gone on record several times in the past few years to accuse Iran of trying to undermine the fledgling government, with General David McKiernan accusing Iran earlier this month of training and supporting Taliban fighters. The 9/11 Commission Report stated that ever since meetings in the early 90s between Al Qaeda and Iran, they have cooperated on several occasions.
However, even if Iran could actually be trusted to remain faithful to the Afghan Government - and such support was successful in defeating the Taliban - Iran might be unlikely to return control of the territory to the Afghan Government; Iranian sympathisers could be installed in positions of leadership, both in the Central Government and at a regional level, thus expanding the Iranian sphere of influence and sending a clear message to the rest of the Middle East.
Many regional experts emphasise caution. Dr Amalendu Masra of Lancaster University in the UK, suggests that involving Iran would make NATO less dependant on help from Pakistan, making it easier to gain Indian support. However, he believes that it would also increase Iranian power in Iraq and Lebanon. He also predicts that if Iran becomes formally involved in Afghanistan, “Iran will quickly start to demand that NATO troops leave Afghanistan, just as it has continually called for an American withdrawal from Iraq. This would obviously conflict with US President Barack Obama’s plans for a troop surge”. Indeed, even as it accepted the American invitation to the summit, the Iranian regime reiterated calls for an American withdrawal.
Whatever the benefits of a stable Afghanistan to Iran, the current state of relations between Iran and America and the context in which this offer is being made, mean that the Iranian regime is unlikely to be swayed by vague promises. President Obama, an avid poker player, surely realises this all too well. Instead, Iran will demand substantial concessions immediately, probably including some sort of acceptance of its nuclear programme. Tehran is also likely to force America to drop its symbolic support of pro-democracy activists, whom it has been funding since 2006 (though this funding is extremely controversial within the activist community). After all, although necessary, the myriad of alliances that America has forged in the “Global War on Terror” has done little to help the cause of democracy in those countries.
Although a declaration by Iran, stating its intention to stop supporting terrorists and insurgents, would be welcome, the regime in Tehran is unlikely to do so unless it believes that such action is in its own interests. Given that both Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad see a democratic Middle East as a threat, cooperation will come at a cost. Whilst Iranian participation might help to stabilise Afghanistan temporarily, it would be a strategic disaster for the wider area in the long term. If President Obama is genuine about victory in Afghanistan, there is no reason why NATO cannot succeed without Iranian help. Especially, as even the limited help promised so far is likely to come with rather long strings attached.