As predicted, one of the winners of this round of European elections has been groups labelled, somewhat imprecisely, the “Euro-skeptic Right”.
The vision of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), working incessantly to tear down the EU is fascinating and reminds one of the old Marxist creed of using the force of the capitalist state in order to tear it down. The analogy is suggestive and although a little far fetched, might contain an element of truth. What allows us to group together very different political forces from around the continent under the label of “Euro-skeptic Right” is the fact that they almost all champion national sovereignty at the expense of EU governance. Like the old Marxists, they are not fans of reform and piecemeal change; they demand a reduction of the powers of the EU, their final aim being a return to a simple European free trade area. With perhaps the notable exception of Ireland’s Libertas, the “Euro-skeptic Right” does not demand a democratically-oriented reform of European governance, but its cancellation. Yet, unlike the old-time Marxists, they are a profoundly divided front. So divided in fact, that many question whether it makes sense to talk of a unitary “Euro-skeptic Right” at all.
The BNP and the old right
Britain is a country adverse to extremism. With the exception of Blair and Thatcher, one must think back to Winston Churchill to find a charismatic leader of the United Kingdom; and if one were to go back yet further, one might have to settle for King Henry VIII. Britain’s last revolution was in the 17th century - since then, every political change has occurred through parliamentary lawmaking.
With this in mind, the election of two members of the British National Party (BNP) to Brussels and Strasbourg is a political novelty of most importance. In Yorkshire alone the BNP managed to garner over 120,000 votes –surely an indication of something more than a mere protest vote against a British political establishment rattled by the Westminster expenses scandal. The leading ideas of the BNP are very clear and deviate very little from the blueprint of a traditional European (extreme) right wing movement; their ideology is easily recognizable.
They are nationalist and close to the national working class. They oppose immigration and multiculturalism on nationalist grounds, and have typical right-wing concerns with law, order and security. They stand firmly against laissez-faire capitalism and globalization. It is unsurprising that the EU, with its liberal stress on the free circulation of goods, capitals and people finds little sympathy amongst them. Yet one struggles to find something that distinguishes the BNP from Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National or from the Italian La Destra or Forza Nuova. All such parties have ideological roots entrenched in the European Fascism of the ‘30s, and the Third Position ideology of the ‘80s. Their success in Britain might be a novelty, but their presence in European politics is not.
Their ideological stance is illiberal, opposed to the free market and communitarian. The type of community they see as an answer to the degeneration of the modern multicultural capitalist state is an ethnically based national community. In this family we can safely include the various right-wing groups of Eastern Europe- Bulgaria’s Ataka, Romania’s PRM and Hungary’s Jobbik. Their success might have to do with the perception of the failure of market capitalism, coupled with the impotence of the radical left to channel these anti-capitalist feelings. But this is of little importance. What is important is the characterization of such parties as the heirs of the old radical right of the ‘30s. Ideologically, the difference is minimal.
Wilders the ultra-liberal
Compare the old right of Le Pen and Griffin with a figure such as Geert Wilders, a politician who obtained around 17% of the national vote in the Netherlands and who has been chosen by Europe’s media as a figurehead of the “Euro-skeptic Right”. Euroskeptic he certainly is and anti-immigration too: but this is as far as the similarities with Griffin & co. go.
Wilders has repeatedly declared that he objects to Islam “as an ideology” rather than as a religion or as an ethnic affiliation. It might not be the best policy to take the words of extremist leaders at face value, yet there is something to be said about this particular stance taken by Wilders. Born in liberal Holland, the extremism that characterizes Wilders is a liberal one, not dissimilar to American neo-conservatism, except for the religious element. Wilders does object to immigration, especially Muslim immigration and yet on peculiarly liberal grounds: for him Muslim immigration is a threat to the liberal societies of Europe and to their liberal values. He comes from the Dutch Liberal Party and grew up politically under the influence of Dutch liberal guru Frits Bolkenstein. Herein lies the key to Wilders’ diversity from the traditional European right: he is a liberal.
In a speech given to the Nexus Conference in Amsterdam in 2005 on “On a Good Society”, Bolkenstein talks of the problem of multiculturalism and offers a staunch defense of Western civilization as the outcome of the Enlightenment project. He defends the right to judge cultures on the basis of the standards of the Enlightenment: rights, civil liberties and political liberalism. He concludes, somewhat prophetically: “…what is a good society? The answer is: one that cherishes the values of the Enlightenment and… abhors political correctness”
In this we can identify Wilders’ peculiarity and the difference between him and the illiberal right of Le Pen. Wilders is the product of Dutch political culture and as such cannot share the communitarian beliefs of the traditional right. He is in favour of gay rights and is an atheist and is firmly convinced, like Bolkenstein, that a good society is a society based on individual rights and the distinction between the public and the private. He diagnoses a threat to this Western way of living, and tries to stand up in defense of these values.
Compare this to Le Pen or Nick Griffin. Euro-skepticism is instrumental and not necessary to Wilders’ political discourse. Wilders sees the nation state as a more effective means for the construction of a liberal society - on this ground he opposes the European project. Le Pen and Griffin see the national community as a political and ethical goal and not merely a tool for delivering other goods. Their opposition to a European federation follows necessarily from their nationalism. For Wilders, the problem with Islam is that it threatens a civilization based on Enlightenment values. For Griffin and Le Pen, immigration is the logical consequence of an absurd adherence to an ideology of liberal rights.
While the two parties might share some contingent political platforms, their roots and ideals could not be more different. Their opposition to Europe and immigration has different origins and such differences are certain to manifest in the next legislature. It is highly unlikely that Wilders and Griffin will join the same political group in the European Parliament. Euro-skepticism is not sufficient to unite two different ideologies.